Poland’s gambling market presents an intriguing paradox. It is growing, attracting major bookmakers and generating increasing turnover, yet operates under one of Europe’s most demanding tax and regulatory models.
The taxation of betting attracts the most debate. In Poland, betting is generally subject to a 12% tax on the total stakes paid in; a separate 2.5% rate applies to certain bets on sporting competition involving animals. Tax is therefore levied before the operator's actual business result is known. This differs fundamentally from taxation based on GGR, the difference between players' stakes and winnings paid out.
Calls to change this model are not new, but return with data showing both growth in the legal market and the continued presence of operators outside Poland’s system.
12% of stakes is not the same as taxing the result
Under a turnover tax, the state takes a portion of every zloty wagered. Operators must account for this cost regardless of whether a bet produces a profit or a substantial payout to the player.
This directly affects product design. The higher the fixed cost attached to turnover, the less room remains for competitive odds, promotions, bonuses, cashback and other features that make legal offers attractive.
That is why parts of the industry argue that the problem is not just the tax rate, but above all its base. GGR is closer to a bookmaker's actual operating result, while turnover shows only the value of stakes accepted.
If the market is growing, why change anything?
This is the main argument against rapid reform. If revenues rise, licensed operators remain active and the market develops despite high taxation, the state may conclude that the current structure fulfils its purpose.
The problem emerges when we consider not only current receipts but also how much activity remains outside the regulated system.
iGaming Business, citing H2 Gambling Capital estimates, points to a very high gross yield in Poland’s sports betting market relative to turnover. These estimates suggest the legal betting segment could reach around EUR 1.62 billion in GGR on approximately EUR 5.07 billion in turnover in 2026. This ratio is substantially higher than in many other markets and illustrates how strongly tax design affects the economics of an offer.
Estimates of the legal channel’s share are also much better for sports betting than online casinos. This matters because the two segments operate under entirely different rules in Poland.
Bookmakers compete; online casinos remain a monopoly
Poland’s Ministry of Finance confirms that private operators may offer online betting after obtaining the appropriate permit. This segment therefore has a licensed market with multiple brands.
Online casinos are different. Internet gambling other than betting and promotional lotteries remains subject to a state monopoly exercised by Totalizator Sportowy.
A private bookmaker may therefore legally accept sports bets in Poland, but cannot simply extend its domestic permit to a conventional online casino with slots, roulette or blackjack.
The Act also provides for a 50% gambling tax rate on, among other things, slot machines, roulette, dice and card games. In the online channel, however, the state monopoly is the decisive factor.
The grey market is regulation’s main test
High taxation can generate substantial revenue from every zloty remaining within the legal system. It does not automatically resolve how many players choose offers outside that system.
If an illegal operator can offer better odds, higher returns or a wider product range, some users will compare precisely those features, even when the website has no right to target Polish customers.
Regulatory effectiveness should therefore not be assessed solely by the nominal tax rate. Equally important are:
- licensed operators’ share of the overall market,
- the genuine attractiveness of regulated offers,
- effective blocking of payments and illegal domains,
- consumer protection,
- the ability to enforce responsible gambling rules.
The more activity moves outside the licensed market, the smaller the actual reach of national regulation.
GGR instead of turnover? This is more than a simple tax cut
Industry discussions regularly return to replacing the 12% tax on stakes with a GGR tax. Past proposals have suggested a rate in the region of 20–25% of GGR.
Such a change would not simply mean “cheaper tax”. It would alter the entire calculation mechanism: the state would tax the operator’s actual gross result rather than every stake accepted.
A potential benefit would be more competitive odds and higher returns for players. In theory, this could increase the legal market’s share, turnover and players’ reuse of funds.
The risk is equally clear: a lower effective tax rate could initially reduce tax revenues. Reform would make sense only if longer-term growth in the legal market genuinely compensated for part of that difference.
Liberalising online casinos is a separate, much larger decision
Changing bookmakers’ taxation and opening the online casino market are two different issues. The betting tax model could change without affecting the casino monopoly. Equally, turnover tax could remain while the scope of the monopoly is debated.
Any liberalisation would require a complete licensing framework covering market entry, operator oversight, player protection, anti-money laundering, advertising, limits and responsible gambling tools.
The current debate should therefore not be treated as a sign that the market will open soon. Industry discussion is not a legislative bill, and Poland's model still rests on a state monopoly for online casino games.
What could a realistic reform look like?
A phased approach seems more plausible than a single sweeping move. The state could first examine whether the current tax on stakes truly maximises not only fiscal revenues but also the legal market’s share.
In practice, a sound analysis should compare several scenarios:
- retaining the 12% turnover tax,
- moving to GGR taxation at different rates,
- changing licensed operators’ bonus and promotion rules,
- further strengthening payment blocks and the illegal domain register,
- assessing each option’s impact on player protection and the grey market.
The priority is finding a balance where legal products remain competitive, regulations can be enforced effectively and the state continues to receive stable tax revenues.
Radio Sloty: the legal market’s share matters most
A high tax rate alone does not demonstrate good or bad regulation. The outcome of the whole system matters.
If taxation is high but most players remain with licensed operators, the state retains market oversight and can enforce safety standards. If tax design makes legal offers clearly weaker than illegal alternatives, some fiscal benefits may be illusory.
The question about reform should therefore be not 'Are taxes too high?' but 'Which model delivers the largest legal-market share with reasonable revenue and effective player protection?'
That is a much harder question, but it will shape the future of Polish iGaming.
Sources and transparency
This is an original Radio Sloty analysis. It draws on data and statements in the iGaming Business article dated 27 July 2026, alongside current Ministry of Finance information about gambling tax rates and the rules for legal gambling in Poland.
18+ | Gambling involves the risk of financial loss and addiction. Use only legal services and play responsibly.
Sources and verification
- Ministry of Finance — gambling tax rates and limits
- Ministry of Finance — tax base and basic information
Discussion of a different tax model is editorial analysis; it does not mean such a reform has been enacted. Sources checked on 4 October 2026. Conditions and publications may be updated.
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